
4:35 65 NATO to have it to be HE WALL TO A SER ! 125 10 5 16 18 18 18 September 1961 or their talking Jan 140 100 100 The result for MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT when the wire, of the delignment of the 1. At the five e'clock meeting this evening, we will receive the State-Referen-Treasury replies to the ten questions which you posed with regard to the ismediate call-up of four Matienal Guard divisions, and the possible shipment of six additional divisions and support to Europe about the first of next year. It is my understanding that the mendation will be to call up the four Guard divisions now and shertly to deploy to Europe one division of the present STRAC. 2. The justification for this recommendation will be found in the reply to the ten questions. The argument runs that further mebilization and deployments should be taken at this time to convey to the USSE and NATO our determination to defend our interest in Berlin-with the ultimate objective of increasing MATO defensive capability This defensive requirement is represented by the 32-division goal which we have set for ourselves and our Allies for the end of 1961. If events turn out that this increese is not needed in Europe, it will be needed to increase over-all reedings to deal with other trouble spots such as Iran and Southeast Asia. 3. The Secretary of Defense appears to be confident of coping with the legistical problems and the requirement of more conventional air support arising from any substantial increase in U.S. division strength in Europe. He estimates that the four Matienal Guard divisions can be completely converted to Active Army divisions in 6-12 months, the exact time depending on the availability of trained replacements and the dorree of combet residness maintained during conversion. However, he is not ready at this time to recommend converting these divisions at once if they are called up. 4. The answer to your query whether am increase of U.S. divisions in Europe may not trigger a similar or larger reinforcement in East

Germany on the part of the Reputant is yes, but it is pointed out that

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the Soviets may do se anyway.

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5. General Horsted's views have just been obtained by coble, and the respect to the foregoing on several points. We is egainst deployments at this time, but enderses the placesed trops engenetation in Europe and the four division call up. Hr. Hollemera will cover Horsted's views at the meeting.

4. In the course of the discussion this afternoon, you may wish to develop some of the fallering points:

2. To what increases one our MATO Allies firstly consisted?
If we put up six more divisions for Europe, what are the chosens of reaching the 32-division level in the next few weathe? What further precising is necessary, and by whos?

h. If we need air divisions to Barage, should we emprove a time limit for the deretion of the increase?

g. What other actions should be considered for impress the Unit our saciousses on Resize? Decises Hartson? Emergency? Excepts, mentions production! More six defenses at home and in Europe? Call up more cargo shipping? Assessment as lede place for the withdrawns of dependents? Here Civil Defenses activity?

d. What other decisions are measurement to get so with the herizon program presented or Saptember 77 (For example, the initiation of production of NEEL/NEEL, the conversion of the Gound divisions to Army of the Matter States; the deployment of methor entries; to the Matter research.

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